Δημοσιεύουμε με κάθε επιφύλαξη απόρρητα σήματα που φέρονται να έχουν σταλεί από το State Department στην Κύπρο (και αντίστροφα) και αφορούσαν την υπόθεση των πυρομαχικών που κατασχέθηκαν (και τελικά εξερράγησαν στο πρόσφατο ατύχημα).

****************************************************************************

id: 188392
date: 1/22/2009 22:35
refid: 09STATE5968
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5968 0222244
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 222235Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0000

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T STATE 005968

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, SY, CY
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF MILITARY-RELATED ITEMS FROM IRAN
TO SYRIA

Classified By: ISN ACTING DAS Philip A. Foley,
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)

SUMMARY
——–

1. (S) The M/V MONCHEGORSK, a Cypriot-flagged vessel
chartered by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)
is carrying Iranian-origin military-related cargo from Bandar
Abbas, Iran to Tartous, Syria. A boarding party from a U.S.
Navy warship boarded and inspected the vessel on two separate
occasions, and found ammunition, high explosives, compressed
gunpowder, and slugs among its cargo. Subsequently, this has
been reported by the Associated Press. M/V MONCHEGORSK will
likely arrive at the Suez Canal on 23 or 24 January.

ACTION REQUEST
————–

2. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 4, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Republic of Cyprus (ROC) officials and
request that the ROC, as the vessel’s flag state, divert the
M/V MONCHEGORSK into a Cypriot port and detain its cargo.

OBJECTIVES
———-

3. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:

— Provide Cypriot officials with information, including
photographs of the inspection (provided septel), regarding
the cargo of the M/V MONCHEGORSK;

— Emphasize to the Cypriot officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel;

— Urge the Government of Cyprus (GOC) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747, and in accordance with
the ROC’s laws and authorities; and

— (If Raised/Asked) Indicate that the USG is willing to
discuss options for disposition of the cargo with the ROC, as
well as provide technical support in identifying the cargo.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
————————

4. (S//REL CYPRUS) Begin talking points/non-paper:

— The Cypriot-flagged vessel M/V MONCHEGORSK is carrying
Iranian-origin military-related cargo to Syria.

— A boarding team from a U.S. Navy vessel was granted
permission by the ship’s master to inspect M/V MONCHEGORSK on
19 and 20 January 2009

— The inspection revealed containers carrying 120 mm, 122
mm, 125 mm, and 160 mm high explosives that originated in
Iran and are destined for Syria. Inspection also revealed
7.62 mm shell casings, compressed gunpowder, silver
dollar-sized slugs, primer, and magnesium primers. M/V
MONCHEGORSK will likely arrive at the Suez Canal on 23-24
January 2009.

— UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran.

— As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747.

— In particular, we request that, as the M/V MONCHEGORSK’s
flag state, the Republic of Cyprus divert the vessel to a
Cypriot port and detain the cargo

IF ASKED:

— We did not request flag-state consent to board the vessel
pursuant to our bilateral Ship-Boarding Agreement due to
uncertainty regarding whether or not the cargo was
WMD-related.

— We are willing to discuss with you options for the
disposition of this cargo, as well as support your efforts to
identify the cargo.

If Asked About the Press Stories

— In any public statements regarding the matter we will
highlight Cyprus’s support for international nonproliferation
efforts and the positive nature of our bilateral,
non-proliferation cooperation, but we will not, without prior
consultation, make public any support or actions your
government may take in this matter.

END POINTS.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT
———————

5. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible.

POINT OF CONTACT
—————-

6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up is Mark
Felipe, ISN/CPI, 202-647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.

7. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, and T.
CLINTON

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 188990
date: 1/27/2009 12:43
refid: 09NICOSIA58
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: SECRET
destination: 09STATE5968
header:
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000058

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, SY, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS WASHING HANDS OF M/V MONCHEGORSK?

REF: A. STATE 5968
B. EUR/SE-EMBASSY O-I OF JANUARY 26

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: It is becoming evident that the Republic of
Cyprus, likely fearing Cyprus Problem-related “reprisals”
from Damascus, hopes to avoid having to interdict and/or
divert to an RoC port the M/V Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged,
Russian-owned ocean freighter carrying arms from Iran to
Syria in contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions
1747 and 1803 (Ref A). Presidential Diplomatic Coordinator
Leonidas Pantelides informed the Ambassador at 1215 hrs local
(0515 DC) on January 27 that Cyprus had requested the ship’s
owner to radio the master to divert to Limassol, but as yet
had received no response. “This is all that we can do,”
Pantelides insisted. At its present speed and direction, the
Monchegorsk will reach Syria by 2330 Zulu January 27. END
SUMMARY.

——————————————-
Current Status of Vessel, Shipping Company:
——————————————-

2. (S) U.S. Navy sources told the Embassy that the
Monchegorsk, at its current heading and 11-knot speed, should
reach Latakeia, Syria, its final destination, by 2330 hrs
Zulu January 27. NSA contacts report the ship has not
received or transmitted radio messages recently (NFI).
Embassy interlocutors at the Cyprus Shipping Chamber report
that NB Shipping Limited, a Limassol company still listed as
the registered owner of the Monchegorsk, recently came close
to losing its right to fly the Cyprus flag for unrelated
non-compliance with national maritime standards.

————————————-
High-level Local Diplomatic Activity:
————————————-

3. (S) In last 24 hours, the Embassy has engaged chief
Palace diplomat Pantelides (three times), Presidential
Commissioner/chief Cyprus Problem negotiator George Iacovou,
and MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas Emiliou,
drawing liberally on the legal arguments provided in Ref B
(these calls were in addition to the direct demarche the
Ambassador had made to RoC President Demetris Christofias on
January 23). Pantelides at 1100 hrs on January 27 confirmed
that a recall of the Monchegorsk to Limassol had been issued,
but no response had yet been received. Under the Cypriot
standard operating procedure, the Merchant Shipping
Department had notified the owners, who were ultimately
responsible for making the ship pull into port — there was
no direct RoC contact with the ship (an Embassy contact in
the shipping industry later confirmed the SOP). The
Ambassador emphasized the obligations of Cyprus as the flag
state to take action, and noted Washington’s
highest-possible-level interest. Pantelides seemingly hoped
to keep the Monchegorsk out of United Nations Security
Council discussions, and queried whether the Monchegorsk
issue was already under consideration in New York.

4. (S) In a 1215 hrs follow-up telcon, Pantelides referred
back to Ref B points and stated his government had “done what
it needed to do” in alerting the Monchegorsk’s owner; he
subsequently faxed us text from the RoC instruction (below).
The Ambassador asked whether Cyprus could use the assistance
of the United States in contacting the ship directly to make
Cyprus’s instructions known to the captain, or otherwise
provide additional help. Pantelides deflected both
questions, making clear the RoC did not want the U.S.
involved. “The Monchegorsk is already half-way there,” he
ended, somewhat cryptically.

5. (S) Text of the RoC message follows. The fax was not on
letterhead, lacked sender and receiver names, titles, and
addresses, and featured visible cut-and-paste marks. It was
obviously just a short excerpt from the notification letter.

“Dear Captain Smirnov

NICOSIA 00000058 002 OF 002

The reason that we ask you to direct the ship to Limassol is
to ensure that its cargo is in conformity with UN Security
Council Resolutions 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008).

Any cargo which is not in conformity has to be unloaded at
Limassol in order to avoid infringement of the above
Resolutions and violation of the Cyprus Ships (Prohibition of
Transportation) Laws 1966-1971 (Law 26/66 as amended).

——————
Why the Cold Feet?
——————

6. (C) COMMENT: Greek Cypriots learn Security Council
resolutions like others learn their ABCs — early and by
heart. No country pays more lip service to their status at
the top of the international pyramid. Why, then, the seeming
disregard for RoC obligations under 1747 and 1803? Contacts
ranging from President Christofias to worker bees at the MFA
informed us that Cyprus’s 2006 decision to interdict the M/V
Gregorio, a vessel carrying missile radar equipment from
North Korea to Syria, had caused grave damage to its
bilateral relations with Damascus. The Syrians had responded
by green-lighting regular ferry service between Latakeia and
the “occupied” port of Famagusta in the “Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.” Highest-level RoC entreaties have failed
to compel Damascus to end the sea link, one of the few clear
diplomatic blows the Cypriots have taken recently. They
worry that further government action against the Monchegorsk
might provoke Damascus to take further steps to “upgrade” the
“TRNC.”
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 189191
date: 1/28/2009 13:39
refid: 09NICOSIA73
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: SECRET
destination: 09ANKARA3|09NICOSIA58
header:
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1334

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T NICOSIA 000073

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR, NEA, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: M/V MONCHEGORSK STILL LOITERING OFF
LARNACA

REF: A. NICOSIA 58
B. ANKARA 3

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S) Ship status: U.S. Navy sources report at 1500 hrs
local (0800 hrs DC) that the M/V Monchegorsk is holding
position some 60 nautical miles southeast of Larnaca.

2. (C) Diplomatic activity since last update (Ref A):
Following EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried’s telephone
call to RoC Presidential Commissioner George Iacovou, RoC
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides telephoned the
Ambassador at 1845 hrs January 27 to inform that the
Monchegorsk was no longer steaming toward Latakeia, Syria,
but rather was loitering 60 miles from Larnaca, awaiting
further instructions.

3. (C) At 1000 hrs January 28, the Ambassador telephoned
Pantelides for an update, learning that the vessel had not
moved overnight. The parties to the incident “were speaking
through their lawyers,” the RoC diplomat noted, attempting to
determine their next steps. Further, he had been informed
that the ship had been told to be prepared to proceed to port
(Note: we have transcribed Pantelides’s fuzzy, passive
voiced language verbatim.) The Ambassador asked Pantelides
which port in Cyprus would receive the Monchegorsk; he
replied that it had not yet been decided.

4. (C) The Ambassador highlighted recent media reporting
that Turkey, in a similar case, had detained a suspect
Iranian shipment allegedly heading to Venezuela (Ref B).
Pantelides sounded intrigued and asked that we forward the
press pieces. Ambassador also offered to share, and
Pantelides accepted, declassified/releasable photographs of
the Monchegorsk’s cargo taken during the USN’s earlier
boarding. Finally, the Ambassador repeated earlier offers of
U.S. assistance in the matter and urged Pantelides to request
an independent cargo inspection conducted by Cypriot military
and/or security officials, once the vessel reaches port.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 189323
date: 1/29/2009 6:51
refid: 09STATE7877
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09STATE5968
header:
O 290651Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T STATE 007877

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2039
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL, CY, IR, SY
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE ROC REGARDING THE M/V MONCHEGORSK

REF: A. STATE 5968
B. EUR/SE-EMBASSY O-I OF JANUARY 26

Classified by: ASSISTANT SECRETARY DANIEL FRIED, EUR.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (U) This is an Action Request. Please see
paragraph 4.

2. (S) Background and Objective: The M/V MONCHEGORSK, a
Cypriot-flagged, Russian owned vessel leased by Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), left Bandar
Abbas, Iran in mid-January, bound for Latakia, Syria. On
January 19 and 20, U.S. naval forces in the Red Sea
twice boarded the vessel with the master’s consent to
inspect the cargo. Initial reports indicated that the
cargo consisted of large-caliber cannon shells and small
arms ammunition-related components. A more thorough
examination of the data resulting from the inspection
indicates that the portion of the cargo that was
inspected consisted of components, including propellant,
for various caliber artillery, tank, and small arms
rounds. Based on these additional details, we consider
this shipment of “arms or related material” from Iran a
violation of UNSCR 1747.

3. (S) The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) agreed to take
action as the flag state and issued a voluntary recall
of the Monchegorsk to port in Cyprus. Updated
information as of 1900 EST, January 28, 2009, indicated
the vessel was prepared to proceed to Limassol, Cyprus
and would probably arrive early the morning of 29
January. The Department requests Embassy Nicosia to
urge the ROC to be as assertive as possible in
encouraging the ROC to conduct a thorough inspection of
the cargo.

4. (S/REL CYPRUS) Action Request: Embassy Nicosia is
asked to use, as needed, the following points with ROC
officials.

Begin Points

— There is continued concern at the highest levels of
the USG about the cargo of the M/V Monchegorsk.

–Following the U.S. Naval personnel boarding of the M/V
Monchegorsk on January 19 and 20, the USG believes the
transfer of cargo on board may be a violation of UNSCR
1747.

–Given our knowledge of this transshipment, we may need
to raise this issue at the UN Security Council.

–We would like to fully coordinate any actions taken by
our Mission in NY with your government.

–We would especially like to be able to refer to the
positive actions taken by Cyprus to ensure this ship was
not allowed to violate the terms of UNSCR 1747.

–In particular, we would again strongly urge the ROC to
be as assertive as possible in instructing the
Monchegorsk to dock in Cyprus, so a thorough inspection
of the cargo can take place.

— However, if the ship arrives in Syria, without the
ROC’s best efforts to support the relevant UNSCRs, the
USG would not be able to portray the ROC’s actions in
the most positive light. As UNSCR 1747 makes clear in
para 5, “States shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in
the territory of Iran.

–The USG remains willing to assist in any way possible.

End Points

5. (S/REL CYPRUS) The following points may also be
reiterated at Post’s discretion. These points are drawn
from Ref. B.

Begin Points

–Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security
Council may decide what measures are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions and it may call upon Member
States to apply such measures. Under Article 25 of the
Charter, UN member states have agreed to accept and
carry out the Council’s decisions in accordance with the
Charter.

–Under operative paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747, unanimously
adopted under Article 41, the Security Council decided
that:

-Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly
or indirectly from its territory? any arms or
related materiel; and

-all states shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran? using their flag vessels or
aircraft.

-The Cypriot-flagged vessel M/V MONCHEGORSK is carrying
Iranian-origin arms-related military cargo to Syria.

-An inspection conducted by a US Navy ship on January 19
and 20 revealed containers carrying 120 mm, 122 mm, 125
mm, and 160 mm high explosives that originated in Iran
and are destined for Syria. Inspection also revealed
7.62 mm shell casings, compressed gunpowder, silver
dollar-sized slugs, primer, and magnesium primers.

-Consequently, Cyprus has an obligation to prevent the
use of the M/V MONCHEGORSK – a Cypriot-flagged vessel —
from participating in this transaction.

-In addition, Operative Paragraph 11 of UNSCR 1803 calls
upon states to inspect cargoes to and from Iran, of
aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports,
owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic
of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is
transporting prohibited goods.

-It is extremely important that Cyprus take positive
action to stop this shipment in order to protect the
integrity and sound reputation of its ship registry.

End Points

END TEXT.

CLINTON

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 189349
date: 1/29/2009 9:25
refid: 09NICOSIA75
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: SECRET
destination: 09NICOSIA58|09NICOSIA73
header:
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T NICOSIA 000075

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, ISN, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: M/V MONCHEGORSK ANCHORED OFF LIMASSOL

REF: A. NICOSIA 73
B. NICOSIA 58

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S) Ship’s Location and Status: USS Barry reported that
the M/V Monchegorsk entered Cypriot territorial waters at
0315 Zulu on January 29. Roughly four hours later, it
arrived at the port of Limassol, where it remains at
anchorage.

2. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The evening of January 28,
Israeli DCM informed Embassy Econoff that GoI Ambassador
Avrahaam Haddad had been in close contact with RoC Diplomatic
Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides regarding the Monchegorsk.
Haddad telephoned the Ambassador on January 29 to brief on
his activities and request a recap of USG actions.

3. (C) The Ambassador at 1030 hrs local (0330 DC) telephoned
Pantelides to commend Cyprus’s decision to bring the
Monchegorsk to Limassol. Ambassador reminded Pantelides that
the Cypriots’ letter of recall which he (Pantelides) had
shared with us specifically informed the Monchegorsk “that
any cargo not in conformity with UN Security Resolutions 1747
and 1803 must be unloaded in Limassol to avoid infringement
of the UNSCRs and violation of RoC shipping rules and
regulations.” Ambassador again offered U.S. technical
assistance in the matter. He also solicited the RoC’s
envisioned way-forward, and consulted on a strategy for
handling media inquiries — Ambassador told Pantelides that
the Embassy would refrain from making any comments beyond
what was already in the press and would refer questions to
the Foreign Ministry. (Note: Leading daily “Phileleftheros”
on January 29 ran an article on the Monchegorsk, essentially
a translation of a days-earlier AP story in which CJCS ADM
Mullen allegedly voiced U.S. disappointment over its
inability to detain the Monchegorsk in the Red Sea.)

4. (C) Pantelides confirmed that the Monchegorsk was at
anchor in Limassol, but would provide little specific on
Cyprus’s planned course of action. Early reports from RoC
maritime officials had corroborated the existence of large
quantities of high explosives on board, a fact, Pantelides
noted, that troubled the Cypriots on safety grounds. He
confirmed his government would undertake a more thorough
inspection, but deflected the offer of U.S. assistance,
claiming the RoC wanted to go “step by step” before
committing to off-load any cargo. As to press, he concurred
with the proposed strategy, requesting the Embassy limit its
commentary to confirmation that U.S. forces had boarded the
vessel a week earlier in the Red Sea.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 189435
date: 1/29/2009 14:50
refid: 09NICOSIA77
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09NICOSIA58|09NICOSIA73|09NICOSIA75
header:
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0077 0291450
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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9567
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1336

—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000077

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, ISN, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GOVERNMENT SEEKING MUTUALLY-PALATABLE END
STATE

REF: A. NICOSIA 75
B. NICOSIA 73
C. NICOSIA 58

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) Ship Status: M/V Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in
the Limassol port. Cypriot maritime officials have conducted
a cursory inspection, finding large quantities of high
explosive on board. RoC officials promise a more thorough
inspection is forthcoming.

2. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The Ambassador at 1545 hrs
local (0845 DC) telephoned Presidential Diplomatic
Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides seeking the latest on the M/V
Monchegorsk recall. Pantelides responded that Cypriot
officials were inspecting the ship now and “would find what
you found.” He was unsure what the government would do once
it discovered military materiel, however. Pantelides made
clear the RoC understood it could not let the ship reach
Syria. Yet it also aimed to prevent Iranian/Syrian goods
being stuck on its territory.

3. (C) Brainstorming, the RoC diplomat floated the
possibility of transferring the cargo to the United Nations
in some creative way. UNFICYP likely was out, owing to its
restrictive mandate; also, transfer to UNFICYP likely would
require bringing the materiel on land, which the government
hoped to avoid. But might UNIFIL be a possibility?
Pantelides ventured. That UN mission runs its sea operations
out of Limassol. He questioned whether the Monchegorsk’s
haul could be transferred to a German ship operating under
the UN flag, and taken out of Cyprus.

4. (C) Ambassador welcomed the creative thinking and
promised to follow up with Washington. He emphasized that
the aim of the USG was not to punish Cyprus, but to prevent
an illegal Iranian arms export. Pantelides responded by
noting he would continue to be in close communication with
the Embassy. He would wait for any other U.S. proposals that
might allow the RoC to remove the materiel from Cyprus
without it ending up in Syria.

5. (C) Comment: The RoC is clearly feeling the heat and
wants to avoid a confrontation with Syria and Iran.
Pantelides worries, with reason, that the Monchegorsk
incident will break soon into the contentious Cypriot press,
and he is looking for a way out before it becomes an
embarrassment to the government. From their perspective,
some sort of UN cover would make “doing the right thing”
easier and more palatable, since the very hardest political
pill for the RoC to swallow would be off-loading the cargo on
land while its final disposition is decided. We leave to
Washington and New York experts the determination of whether
Pantelides’s UNIFIL idea, or some other arrangement involving
the UN, will fly.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 189669
date: 1/30/2009 14:11
refid: 09NICOSIA93
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09NICOSIA18|09NICOSIA73|09NICOSIA75|09NICOSIA78
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000093

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, ISN, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, PGOV, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: MFA SEEKING LEGAL OPINIONS,
PRESIDENCY EVALUATING DISPOSITION OPTIONS

REF: A. URBANCIC-FITZPATRICK EMAIL OF 30 JANUARY
B. NICOSIA 18
C. NICOSIA 73
D. NICOSIA 75
E. NICOSIA 78

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (U) This telegram contains action requests; please see
Paragraphs 3, 4, and 11.

————
Ship Status:
————

2. (C) M/V Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in the Limassol
port. Cypriot maritime officials have conducted a cursory
inspection, finding high explosives of obvious military
usage. They intend to inspect further the contents of 55
crates on board — possibly the same ones checked earlier by
U.S. Navy personnel.

—————————-
MFA: Legal Findings Desired
—————————-

3. (C) Diplomatic Activity: At 1015 hrs local (0315 DC),
MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas Emiliou
summoned the Ambassador for discussions on the M/V
Monchegorsk; owing to a prior commitment, PolChief attended
in his place. Emiliou opened by noting Cyprus’s great
interest in alleged comments by CJCS ADM Mike Mullen that the
U.S., after halting the Monchegorsk on the high seas, had let
the vessel proceed after determining it had no legal grounds
to detain it. In preparing the MFA’s own legal opinion as to
the applicability of UN Security Council Resolutions 1747 and
1803 to the materiel shipment, Emiliou wished first to see
the USG’s findings — if possible, something more elaborate
than the short non-papers the Embassy had delivered so far.

4. (C) The MFA diplomat claimed that 1747 was open to
interpretation. There was a difference of opinion on the
Ministry’s legal team, with some experts believing that OP
5’s call on states to prohibit the procurement of any arms or
related materiel from Iran using their flag vessels related
only to nuclear weapons-related materiel (since the entire
resolution preamble, as well as OPs 1-4, dealt primarily with
Iran’s nuclear program.) This was Syria’s position, Emiliou
noted. In fact, Damascus had deployed a high-level envoy to
Nicosia, the Syrian Deputy FM, who was applying significant
pressure to allow the vessel to depart for Latakeia. Emiliou
again requested U.S. legal thinking, here, on why 1747
applied for conventional (vice nuclear) materiel.

5. (C) Cypriot maritime officials had conducted a cursory
check of the Monchegorsk and discovered significant
quantities of high explosives that were clearly military in
nature, Emiliou informed. They would perform more detailed
checks shortly, having identified 55 suspicious crates (Note:
likely those already inspected by U.S. personnel.) Should
the RoC’s attorneys determine the cargo was subject to UNSC
sanctions, the overarching Cypriot desire was to remove it
soonest from the island, owing to “heavy pressure” from
Damascus and Teheran. Cyprus would require assistance from
friendly nations in disposing of the materiel, Emiliou
concluded.

———————————–
Brits Ready to Assist, if Necessary
———————————–

6. (C) Ambassador at 1200 hrs called on UK High Commissioner
Peter Millet. Millet informed that 18 hours earlier, he had
received confusing instructions from a CENTCOM-based UK
officer to intervene with the RoC on the Monchegorsk. He had
sat on the instructions, however, in order to get more
clarity and to consult with us. In response to USG
brainstorming over the possibility of using the British

NICOSIA 00000093 002 OF 003

Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in the disposition of the cargo,
Millet noted some practical difficulties, but assured the
SBAs could accept the cargo “both physically and
politically.” London wanted this shipment interdicted as
much as Washington, he assured, and he personally stood ready
to approach the Cypriots on the matter.

7. (C) Akrotiri, the western SBA, could accommodate landing
craft-sized vessels but nothing the size of the Monchegorsk,
Millet explained. Should the RoC want to move the cargo to
the British base, it first would need to move it through
Limassol port. The SBA did bring ammunition and explosives
through Limassol on weekend nights when there was little port
traffic, under police escort, however.

—————————————-
Presidency: UN Option Preferable to SBA
—————————————-

8. (C) Ambassador at 1330 hrs contacted Presidency
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides (Ref A). He
restated U.S. appreciation for Cyprus recalling the ship, and
assured that Washington was thinking creatively about an end
state that both allowed the RoC to meet its UNSC obligations
while also respecting Cypriot domestic political and foreign
policy sensitivities. Ambassador explained that USG experts
so far had found no mechanism for affecting a handover of the
Monchegorsk’s cargo to elements of UNIFIL, an idea that
Pantelides had floated a day earlier (Ref E). Would Cyprus
accept some type of transfer to a third party, such as the
Brits via the SBAs, or even the French, whose naval
relationship with Cyprus was strong?

9. (C) Cyprus plainly preferred a solution involving the
French and UN than one using the SBAs, Pantelides responded
(likely owing to the bases’ political sensitivities here.)
Yet RoC lawyers worried that any approach to a third country
would be illegal under the UNSCRs — how was Syria prohibited
from receiving the cargo, for example, but not France or
Britain? Cyprus’s favored tack remained one that provided UN
cover to Cyprus to act. As UNSCR 1803 called on member
states to report to the Security Council, the Cypriots were
envisioning the following way-forward:

— At the request of a Permanent Member of the UNSC (the
United States), Cyprus, as flag nation of the Monchegorsk and
exercising its UNSCR obligations, would report to the Council
that it had hailed and inspected a vessel suspected of
carrying illegal Iranian arms exports;

— Cyprus would include the findings of its inspection and
its conclusion that the shipment seemingly violated UNSCRs
1747 and 1803, and would ask the Council how to proceed.

10. (C) Ambassador committed to relaying Cyprus’s thoughts
to USG policy makers. He saw a number of practical
difficulties with the proposal, however, dealing primarily
with Russia’s stance at the Council. It would be disastrous
were the Russians to block action and leave the Council
deadlocked, leaving the cargo marooned on the island and
Cyprus subjected to increasing pressures from Iran and Syria.
For this proposal to have a chance of success, Moscow’s
support must be obtained beforehand. Had Pantelides
(formerly the RoC ambassador in Moscow) floated the idea with
the Russians? Ambassador asked. He had not, but noted the
government was preparing to do so, likely in New York.

——–
Comment:
——–

11. (C) Official Cyprus is telling us their primary interest
lies in fulfilling UNSC obligations and removing the cargo
from the island, preferably under UN cover. However, RoC
political realities — mainly, the desire to keep Moscow
happy at all costs and prevent Damascus from retaliating by
upgrading relations or links with the “illegal Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus” — pose a countervailing demand

NICOSIA 00000093 003 OF 003

that the vessel eventually reach Syria. We therefore
recommend that Washington keep this in mind as it evaluates
this latest proposal that Cyprus has decided to explore with
the Russians. It is difficult to gauge from here what
Moscow’s position would be once the question reached the
Council or Sanctions Committee. In any case, the RoC is
looking for an out, and the passage of time now increases the
likelihood of an unfortunate government decision to allow the
Monchegorsk to sail.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 190000
date: 2/2/2009 16:31
refid: 09NICOSIA96
origin: Embassy Nicosia
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09NICOSIA79
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—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000096

SIPDIS

E.O.12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PGOV, PREL, IR, SY, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS STILL WEIGHING OPTIONS ON MONCHEGORSK

REFERENCE: NICOSIA 79 AND OTHERS

Classified by AMB Urbancic, reasons 1.4 B and D.

1. (C) Status of Ship: M/V Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in
Limassol, although the Embassy has received reports it might have moved
slightly owing to traffic conditions in the port area. Cypriot
maritime officials are conducting a more-thorough inspection of 50-plus
crates onboard the vessel. According to MFA sources, they have not/not
checked the remaining 40-plus crates, which are inaccessible unless the
Monchegorsk moves pier-side.

2. (C) Diplomatic Activity: French Ambassador Nicolas Galey on
February 2 hosted a strategy session with his U.S., British, and German
counterparts. Galey briefed regarding his latest Monchegorsk-related
communications with MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas
Emiliou and Presidential Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides.
RoC maritime officials continued to inspect the 98 crates on board the
vessel, Galey relayed, “with much to look at and little staff to do the
work.” The inspectors did not have the means to check 40-plus
containers without off-loading the entire cargo at pier-side (which the
Cypriots continue to oppose.)

3. (C) Much of the deliberations on the Monchegorsk had shifted to New
York, Galey noted, with the Cypriot UN Permrep having informed his UK
and French counterparts that Cyprus intended to report the results of
the inspection to the Iran Sanctions Committee and ask the Committee
what actions to take. Locally, Galey felt it most important to ensure
the P-3 and like-minded nations were speaking from the same page, and
raised the necessity of getting European Union leaders more involved,
especially HighRep Javier Solana. German Ambassador Gottfried Zeitz
briefed that “the Six” (the EU-3 plus others) were set to meet in
Frankfurt on February 3 to discuss Iran; Zeitz believed that Solana
would attend, so this forum seemed natural to discuss the Monchegorsk.

4. (C) Zeitz repeated an offer he earlier had made to the RoC (under
instructions) for carte blanche assistance on the Monchegorsk matter;
such aid could comprise sending technical experts from Berlin or even
dispatching a vessel that could remove the cargo from Cypriot
territory. Ambassadors agreed this offer provided the RoC a “way out”
of its current predicament, should it choose to accept it.

5. (C) British High Commissioner Peter Millett raised the need to
ensure that the CypriotsQ report to Sanctions Committee did not spawn
unproductive bickering in New York. He envisioned three possibilities
in its drafting: 1/ Cypriots simply report facts of vessel inspection
(with a violation of 1747 implied); 2/ Cypriots report facts and
request a Committee determination vis-a-vis a violation; and 3/
Cypriots report facts, request Committee determination as well as
marching orders on how to dispose. Option 1 was preferred by all, in
order to prevent lengthy delays in disposition. The French ambassador
offered, after reading UNSCR 1701, that the Committee ought to be
asking Cyprus how it wished to proceed, not vice-versa. Ambassador
Urbancic recommended that we also let the RoC know that the Six should
have an idea of what the RoC would say before the report was actually
sent to the Sanctions Committee. Ambassadors agreed to convey local
P-3 thinking and repeat Germany’s assistance offer to MFA’s Emiliou;
Millett will telephone the MFA diplomat and later share his response
with the others.

6. (C) Also on February 2, Polchief called on MFA Middle East Desk
Officer Dionysus Dionysiou and Russian Deputy Chief of Mission
Alexander Shcherbakov. Regarding the recent visit of the Syrian envoy
to lobby for the MonchegorskQs release (Reftels), Dionysiou, who had
accompanied former RoC Foreign Minister Erato Marcoullis on the RoCQs
last official visit to Damascus in late 2007, assumed the Syrian had
played hardball. They felt they had Cyprus in a corner, emboldened by
the RoC recently having broken EU consensus to support (vice abstain) a
UNGA resolution on the Golan Heights. No end-state other than an RoC
decision to let the vessel proceed to Latakeia would satisfy the SARG,
Dionysiou predicted. Should that not occur, the Syrians would look to
upgrade further their relations with the breakaway “Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus”, and lobby hard on the “TRNC’s” behalf within the OIC.

7. (C) Dionysiou also debunked Emiliou’s assertion that MFA lawyers
were questioning 1747’s application on conventional (vice nuclear)
arms. “OP 5 is clear-cut here,” he claimed. Nonetheless, having
participated in the EU’s drafting of the amended (in 2007) common
position that followed 1747’s passage, he claimed there remained plenty
of constructive ambiguity in the UN text.

8. (C) Shcherbakov claimed that Russia, at least locally, was taking a
relatively hands-off position on the Monchegorsk. UNSCRs 1747 and 1803
prescribed flag state responsibilities and “liabilities,” he claimed,
but mandated nothing for owners (Monchegorsk’s are Russian); as such,
Cyprus was responsible for handling this incident. Press reports that
alleged Moscow was pressuring Nicosia to allow the vessel free passage
to Syria were bunk, he claimed. Rather, Russia had recommended that
Cyprus complete its inspection, send the results to the UN committee,
and act on its recommendations. Shcherbakov expected to receive a copy
of the Cypriots’ findings no later than February 3.
URBANCIC

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 190206
date: 2/3/2009 15:43
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000098

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, PGOR, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: M/V MONCHEGORSK: CYPRUS INSISTS ON UN COVER

REF: NICOSIA 96 AND OTHERS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (U) Status of Ship: No changes since last report.

2. (C) Diplomatic Activity: Ambassador on February 2 spoke
with RoC Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides regarding
latest developments on Monchegorsk. Contradicting recent
messages from the Foreign Ministry regarding the
applicability of UNSCR 1747, Pantelides claimed there was no
doubt the Monchegorsk was carrying proscribed materiel. That
said, Cyprus needed “a blue flag (United Nations) solution,”
or otherwise would prefer to send the cargo back to source
country Iran. He dismissed any option that entailed
transferring the shipment to a third party without UN cover,
such as the German offer reported on February 2 (Reftel).
Giving the cargo to Germany would be acceptable, he
clarified, but only with authorization from the UN.
Pantelides expected the RoC to report its inspection findings
to the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC) before week’s end,
perhaps as early as February 4. The message would include
not only the results of the government’s inspection, but also
questions posed to the ISC regarding disposition of the
Monchegorsk cargo. Pantelides noted the RoC had consulted
with the Russians and Chinese in New York and had been
assured that there would be no difficulties. Ambassador
emphasized that the U.S. believed Cyprus should report a
violation to the Council without open-ended questions;
returning the cargo to Iran was a bad option, he added.

3. (C) Ambassador also discussed next steps with resident UK
High Commissioner Peter Millett. Millett hours earlier had
engaged RoC Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou to urge the
Cypriots to report only their inspection findings to the ISC
and specifically not seek guidance for proceeding. However,
in the face of what appeared to be a near-imminent Cypriot
decision not to report and perhaps let the boat leave,
Millett’s message apparently softened, focusing instead on
the necessity of referring the matter to New York regardless
of wording. Kyprianou claimed that “these people” —
pointing at President Demetris Christofias and fellow AKEL
party glitterati — had allowed the Monchegorsk to become an
ideological, David versus Goliath affair, with “little
Cyprus” naturally cozying up to Syria’s David. Such an
interpretation did not bode well for a solution acceptable to
the U.S., Britain, and others, the Minister concluded.

4. (C) As to immediate next steps, Millett raised the idea
of coordinated telephone calls from P-3-plus-one capitals to
Christofias, at the PolDir level.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 190620
date: 2/5/2009 15:19
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—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000104

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, PGOV, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM

REF: NICOSIA 98 AND OTHERS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (U) This message contains an action request; please see
Paragraph 7.

2. (C) Status of Ship: No changes since last report — M/V
Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in Limassol harbor, under
maritime police observation. Conversations with Palace
officials hint at discord between the RoC, ship’s master and
crew, and ship’s owners, mainly over financial costs of
remaining in Cyprus and/or transit to a third-country (i.e.,
not Syrian) port (Para 6).

3. (C) Diplomatic Activity: The Ambassador at 0900 hrs
local (0200 DC) February 5 contacted Presidential Palace
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides. The United
States regretted the RoC decision to send its unhelpful
letter to the Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC), he began. Now
that the conversations had shifted to New York, however, the
critical issue on-island was to ensure the Monchegorsk did
not escape RoC control. Pantelides assured that Cyprus would
not allow the ship to depart. He repeated that the
government sought UN cover for its actions and wanted to get
the Monchegorsk and its cargo out of Cyprus, but only by
putting it “in possession of the UN.” The RoC had been in
regular contact with Moscow on the matter, and was convinced
the Russians would support its tack in New York.

4. (C) Pantelides called back at 1300 hrs, a touch frazzled
and with a completely different message. “We want to find a
way through this mess,” the Cypriot diplomat insisted,
admitting the government unlikely would receive the response
it had sought via its letter to the ISC. Now Cyprus wanted
to explore a third-country transfer option, which until this
conversation, it had dismissed out-of-hand.

5. (C) “Unofficially” and without committing his government,
Pantelides asked if Malta represented an acceptable venue to
receive the goods. France and Italy had been too “high
profile” for a third-party transfer, he explained.
Neighboring Malta, however, was tiny, and RoC President
Demetris Christofias would be comfortable dealing with the
Maltese. Pantelides wanted to hear U.S. views on the
proposal before fleshing it out further, and presented
Ambassador a broad outline. Cyprus’s thinking entailed
ordering the ship and cargo to Malta, where the containers
would be off-loaded. The Monchegorsk would depart, and the
Maltese would take appropriate action in accordance with
UNSCRs 1747 and 1803. Pantelides did not reveal, however,
whether he had floated this proposal with Valletta, London or
Paris.

6. (C) The only local impediment Pantelides saw was a
possible demand from Monchegorsk’s owners, crew or master for
the RoC to cover transit costs and fees. He and the
Ambassador eventually agreed, however, that those figures did
not appear exorbitant for Cyprus, and that alone should not
derail this options, if it were found otherwise to be
workable. Ambassador committed to report the RoC approach
back to Washington and later share the USG response, whatever
it might be.

7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Without its
desperately-sought “UN cover,” we believe that Cyprus will
continue to resist with all means available the off-loading
of the Monchegorsk in Limassol. We also understand, however,
that the EU is turning up the heat on the RoC to take action
in line with EU Common Positions. Success in Brussels would
be the best outcome to the Monchegorsk affair. Short of
that, we request instructions from Washington on whether to
encourage the RoC to pursue its Malta proposal (we will
continue to track and report it regardless). If this option
is determined to be workable, it will be imperative to have
sufficient assets in place to ensure the ship does not break
and run, as well as assurances from Valletta that it is
willing and capable to accept the illegal cargo.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 190841
date: 2/6/2009 14:30
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classification: SECRET
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000106

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, ISN, NEA, P, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, PGOV, IR, SY, CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CYPRUS FLESHING OUT MALTA IDEA,
CONSIDERING OTHERS

REF: NICOSIA 104 AND OTHERS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (U) Status of Vessel: No changes since last report
(Reftel).

2. (S) Diplomatic Activity: Ambassador at 1130 hrs local
(0430 DC) on February 6 telephoned Presidential Diplomatic
Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides for further clarity on
Pantelides’s day-earlier suggestion that the RoC transport
the M/V Monchegorsk’s cargo to Malta for safe-keeping,
storage, and/or eventual disposition (Reftel). While he had
not yet received formal instructions from Washington to
support the initiative, the Ambassador noted that he had not
heard objections, either. Above all, the United States’
primary goal was to block the export of Iranian munitions. A
response from the Iran Sanctions Committee to Cyprus’s letter
would be coming soon, Ambassador added, and Cyprus needed to
take action. Pantelides was more blunt than usual in
replying. “Cyprus will not be able to withstand the pressure
much longer, and has to find a way out,” he claimed, noting
that Monchegorsk stories were now dominating local media.
The Ambassador inferred that the RoC would act very quickly
once the Sanctions Committee letter arrived, perhaps even
over the weekend.

3. (S) In response to the Ambassador’s query, Pantelides
revealed that Cyprus had not yet put the plan to Malta for
consideration. Later today he intended to flesh out the
proposal, obtain President Demetris Christofias’s support for
it, and, if he received a green light, approach the Maltese
directly. The RoC did not/not want the U.S. to intervene
with Valletta first, he stressed. Ambassador agreed the U.S.
would not contact the Maltese, but restated the U.S. offer to
help with disposition of the goods, both diplomatically and
technically. As usual Pantelides demurred, but promised to
brief the Ambassador after his imminent conversation with the
President.

4. (S) The Ambassador later briefed UK High Commissioner
Peter Millett on the Pantelides call. Millett reported that
the Cypriots had not raised the Malta option in earlier
conversations, but he saw value in exploring the proposal.
The two islands were members of the Commonwealth and European
Union and shared a common (and perhaps paranoid) worldview.
They worked well together, even recently signing an agreement
to provide joint diplomatic and consular services from their
respective missions. Further, Millett observed, Malta likely
would be receptive to EU support for this type of solution to
a UN resolution violation. It would take some effort to
convince the Maltese it was in their own self-interest to
take the Monchegorsk burden off Cyprus, he concluded. That
said, there were no apparent Syrian pressure points on Malta,
unlike on Cyprus.

5. (S) Following up the morning conversation and in response
to recent EUCOM reporting that the Monchegorsk might be
weighing anchor, Ambassador telephoned Pantelides at 1545
hrs. Could we expect developments over the weekend? he
inquired. Pantelides guaranteed that the vessel would not
depart Cypriot waters. In another seeming about-face, he
added that, “if we decide to unload the cargo, the ship will
go to Larnaca (another Cypriot port 40 miles NE of Limassol).
We can deal with it better there.” (Comment: it could be
that pressure in New York and Brussels has left Cyprus
reconsidering its formerly dead-set opposition to bringing
the haul on land.) The Palace diplomat did not offer further
details on the Malta arrangement nor a readout of his meeting
with Christofias, however.

6. (S) Ambassador also engaged French Ambassador Nicolas
Galey on February 6. Galey reported tremendous European
Union pressure on Cyprus in recent days regarding the
Monchegorsk matter. Cyprus had obligations to the EU to
prevent the illegal export and could not stand on the excuse
that action on the Monchegorsk had moved to New York.
Further, Galey reported, member states had warned Cyprus the

NICOSIA 00000106 002 OF 002

cargo could not be returned to Iran. Galey claimed he was
recommending a joint demarche in Nicosia with the P-3 plus
Czechs and Germans. He also would recommend a joint demarche
in Damascus. The United States likely would want to
participate in Nicosia, the Ambassador responded, suggesting
the target be President Christofias himself. He also stated
that Washington likely would provide just about anything
necessary to ensure the cargo did not make it to Syria.
“That takes away the Cypriot argument that they don’t have
the technical capacity to deal with the cargo,” Galey
responded.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 191121
date: 2/9/2009 15:13
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classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000108

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, IO, NEA, ISN, P, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, IR, SY, CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: DECISION ON DISPOSITION “WITHIN 2-3
DAYS”

REF: A. NICOSIA 104
B. BRYZA-FRIEDT EMAIL OF 2/6/09

Classified By: DCM Jonathan Cohen, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) Status of Vessel: The M/V Monchegorsk moved slightly
further from shore on February 7/8. An RoC diplomatic source
claimed the vessel had relocated to keep from blocking
Limassol port traffic. A maritime official cited the
vessel’s dangerous cargo and the need to maintain distance
between the Monchegorsk and other ships. Informing the
latter’s account were recent media stories on the release of
the Iran Sanctions Committee’s interim response to Cyprus’s
request for guidance — the February 8 headline of
English-language “Cyprus Mail” read “Ship Carries Banned
Weapons, UN Says.”

2. (C) Diplomatic Activity: At 1445 hrs local (0745 DC),
Ambassador telephoned RoC Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas
Pantelides. Pantelides confirmed the Monchegorsk remained in
Limassol, although it had had to be moved a short distance to
keep it from stopping port activity. He expected a final RoC
decision within two or three days. Cyprus might still order
the vessel to proceed to Malta; more likely, however, the
government would decide to confiscate the cargo.

3. (C) Ambassador praised the latter possible course of
action. If Cyprus were to confiscate the cargo with aims of
disposing it, the USG would stand ready to lend technical
assistance. In any case, it would be critical to obtain a
complete inventory before Cyprus moved to destroy the goods.
Pantelides again demurred on the offer of technical
assistance, but confirmed the RoC must look into every
container, “so that we know what we are dealing with.8

4. (C) As of local OOB, Embassy contacts at the Czech and
German Embassies had not received instructions for a
Monchegorsk-related, February 9 EU-3-plus-Presidency demarche
on Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou (Ref B). Four hours
later, the Germans reported they had received a message from
Berlin. Owing to the EU ambassadors’ other demands, the call
likely would not occur until February 10, and might drop to
Pantelides’s or Deputy FM Nicolas Emiliou’s level. Czech
Embassy sources too reported a late receipt of instructions
from Prague. They added that details of the demarche would
be finalized at the February 10 Political and Security
Meeting (PSC) in Brussels.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 191255
date: 2/10/2009 10:22
refid: 09USUNNEWYORK103
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classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000103

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PARM, IR, UNSC, MNUC, ETTC, KNNP, CY
SUBJECT: IRAN/CYPRUS: NEXT STEPS ON MONCHEGORSK

REF: A. NICOSIA 104
B. NICOSIA 108
C. USUN 75

USUN NEW Y 00000103 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Amb. Susan Rice, for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: USUN seeks to continue to shape the UN
response to the discovery of Iranian arms-related material on
the M/V Monchegorsk in violation of UN sanctions on Iran.
Such a response should motivate Cyprus to responsibly dispose
of the proscribed cargo and ensure the UN Security Council’s
Iran Sanctions Committee responds in a credible and
proportionate way to this violation. The Iran Sanctions
Committee has already provided an interim response to Cyprus
and we propose a second letter, which would request a
thorough inspection of the cargo, to increase the pressure on
Cyprus to do the right thing. Separately, USUN proposes
that, as a first step in dealing with the actual violation,
the Iran Sanctions Committee would request explanations from
the parties involved (i.e., Iran and Syria). The Committee
would then consider a menu of possible responses, such as
urging enhanced vigilance over the Iranian shipping line
involved. END SUMMARY.

2. (C/NF) USUN seeks to continue to shape the UN response to
the discovery of arms-related materiel aboard the M/V
Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged vessel shipping this cargo
from Iran to Syria in an apparent violation of UNSCR 1747’s
ban on such arms transfers. (NOTE: On February 3, Cyprus
requested guidance from the UN Security Council’s Iran
Sanctions Committee on whether the discovery of the cargo
indeed constituted a sanctions violation and, if so, how to
dispose of the cargo. As of February 9, the vessel is docked
in Cyprus. END NOTE.) An effective UN response should: 1)
motivate Cyprus to dispose responsibly of the proscribed
cargo, and 2) ensure the Iran Sanctions Committee responds in
a credible and proportionate way to the violation itself. We
plan to proceed in a low-key manner that will not unduly
raise the profile of the issue or undermine other diplomatic
priorities with Iran.

DEALING WITH CYPRUS: GIVING NICOSIA A WAY OUT
———————————————

3. (C/NF) As a first step in responding to Cyprus, the Iran
Sanctions Committee has approved an interim response that
confirmed that UNSCR 1747 covers conventional arms (not, as
suggested in the Cypriot letter, just nuclear-related items),
urged Cyprus to retain the cargo for possible further
inspection or until appropriate disposition is determined,
and encouraged Cyprus to explore options for other Member
States to assist in storing, safe-keeping or disposing the
materiel. When Japanese Perm Rep Yukio Takasu hand-delivered
this response to Cypriot Perm Rep Minas Hadjimichael on
February 6, he also said he told Hadjimichael that this
situation was a “clear case of a violation” of UNSCR 1747 and
the materiel should not be returned to Iran.

4. (C/NF) As a next step, USUN intends to propose the
Committee write Cyprus a second letter to say:

— Based on a review of the information provided by Cyprus,
the Committee determines that a violation of UNSCR 1747 has
indeed occurred;

— Before expressing further views on the matter, the
Committee seeks to know the content of all the cargo, not
just the results of the partial inspection conducted by
Cypriot authorities;

— The Committee therefore requests Cyprus to inspect all the
containers.

5. (C/NF) USUN believes the mere prospect of the Committee
sending such a letter — and effectively micro-managing
Cyprus’s response — might inspire Cyprus to accept one of
the many offers of third-party assistance to dispose of the
cargo. We will recommend privately to Hadjimichael that he
convince Nicosia to take advantage of the window provided by
the first letter, since subsequent communications from the
Committee are unlikely to be more politically helpful to
Cyprus.

DEALING WITH IRAN/SYRIA: RESPONDING TO A VIOLATION
——————————————— —–

6. (C/NF) In parallel to our efforts to deal with the

USUN NEW Y 00000103 002.2 OF 002

disposition of the cargo, USUN will seek to focus the Iran
Sanctions Committee on the central issue: a violation of
UNSCR 1747 by Iran (the state that transferred the
arms-related materiel) and Syria (the state that procured the
goods). Per UNSCR 1737, the Iran Sanctions Committee has a
mandate to “examine and take appropriate action on
information regarding alleged violations of measures” imposed
on Iran. To date, however, the Committee has not dealt with
such a clear violation.

7. (C/NF) USUN will propose the Committee first write to the
parties involved (Iran/Syria) to request an explanation and
any further relevant information about the arms-related
materiel within one week. Depending on the responses (or
non-responses), the Committee would then consider possible
actions, such as:

— Send a Note Verbale to notify all UN Member States of this
incident and urge enhanced vigilance of Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which chartered the M/V
Monchegorsk;

— Invite the Perm Reps of Iran and Syria to meet with the
Committee to discuss these incidents and answer questions;

— Send follow-up letters to Iran and/or Syria warning them
against further violations;

— Refer the matter to the Security Council for its
consideration (e.g., a Council Presidential Statement or
discussion).

8. (C/NF) USUN notes that the Cypriot report to the
Committee provides solid evidence of arms-related materiel
found on the M/V Monchegorsk. In line with our low-key
approach, we see no need to share with the Committee
information from U.S. Naval inspections of the Monchegorsk,
unless a Committee member challenges the accuracy of the
Cypriot report and corroboration is required. USUN will also
discourage actual meetings of the Iran Sanctions Committee
unless absolutely required.
Rice

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000125

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, INL, L, P, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2019
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, SY, IR, CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: CARGO OFFLOADED

REF: A. IIR 6 823 0067 09
B. USUN-DOS EMAIL OF 2/13/09
C. NICOSIA 104 AND OTHERS

Classified By: DCM Jonathan Cohen, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) Embassy officials at the Port of Limassol confirmed
on February 13 the 0700 hrs local quayside arrival of the M/V
Monchegorsk. Unloading of the vessel commenced at 0800 and
ended at 1030; Emboffs counted 98 containers off-loaded.
Port authority contacts report that many of them will remain
at quayside for an indeterminate time, as limited truck
availability will make cargo transfer to the naval facility
at Mari a lengthy and complex undertaking (Ref A).

2. (C) A mid-level Foreign Ministry contact told PolChief on
February 13 that the government was pleased with recent
developments on the Monchegorsk matter, as were “all major
players.” Pressed to confirm that that list included Syria
and Iran, the Cypriot diplomat nodded affirmatively and
added, “it seems so.”

3. (C) Late in the evening on February 12, after news
reports had revealed the ship would pull into port the
following day, the Ambassador telephoned Palace Diplomatic
Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides. Pantelides confirmed the
media accounts, adding that there were three containers whose
contents the maritime inspectors had been unable to discern
(note: this jibes with the most recent RoC letter to the
Sanctions Committee, dated February 12 (Ref B)). Pantelides
declined the Ambassador’s offer of USG technical assistance
in determining the containers’ contents.
Urbancic

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 199430
date: 3/29/2009 20:42
refid: 09STATE30114
origin: Secretary of State
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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—————– header ends —————-

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 030114

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: PARM, IR, UNSC, MNUC, ETTC, KNNP, SY, CY
SUBJECT: USUN INSTRUCTION: IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
EFFORTS ON MONCHEGORSK

REF: USUN 305

Classified By: IO Acting A/S James B. Warlick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request.

2. (C) Washington concurs with USUN’s proposed approach
(reftel) for next steps in the Iran Sanctions Committee
with regard to the M/V Monchegorsk incident.

3. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Mission is instructed to engage
the UK and France on possible next steps in the Iran
Sanctions Committee and propose the Chairman of the
Committee (Japan) send a Note Verbale to all UN Member
States providing information on the Monchegorsk incident
and urging enhanced vigilance over possible future
violations. Mission should also propose the Chairman send
a final round of letters to Cyprus, Iran, and Syria.
Mission should use the texts included in paragraphs 4-7
below as a basis for discussion and further development
with the UK and France.

4. (SBU) Proposed text of Iran Sanctions Committee letter
to all UN Member States:

On behalf of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006), I would like to share information
with you regarding a recent violation of measures imposed
in Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) regarding
Iran. The Committee believes this information may help
Member States carry out their international obligations
with respect to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and
1803 (2008), in particular to aid States in detecting and
future violations.

In February 2009, a Member State shared with the Committee
the results of an inspection of the cargo of the M/V
Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged vessel chartered by the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). These
inspections revealed arms-related materiel, including
items described as “bullet shells,” “Gun H.E. [High
Explosive] Full Charge,” “125 mm Gun APFSDS [Armor
Piercing Fin-Stabilizing Discarded Sabot]” and “HEAT [High
Explosive Anti-Tank]. The ship’s manifest indicated that
the cargo was being transferred from Bandar Abbas (Iran)
to Lataki (Syria). This transfer was in violation of
paragraph five of resolution 1747 (2007), which states:

“Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or
indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using
its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel,
and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the
territory of Iran.”

Paragraph five of resolution 1747 (2007) clearly applies
to conventional arms and related materiels. The Member
State that reported this violation, in accordance with its
international obligations, has since retained, unloaded
and stored the cargo. The Committee requested from the
transferring and procuring states additional relevant
information about this transaction, but regretfully no
such information was provided.

In light of this incident, the committee urges all Member
States to redouble their efforts to ensure full
implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
and 1803 (2008). In particular, the Committee recommends
Member States be especially alert for additional
violations that might occur in similar circumstances to
the case described above.

The Committee would also like to call your attention to
the involvement of IRISL in transporting goods prohibited
under resolution 1747 (2007). In this regard, the
Committee would like to recall that in resolution 1803
(2008) the Security Council called upon all States to
inspect the cargoes to and from Iran of vessels owned or
operated by IRISL, provided there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and
1803 (2008). The Committee therefore urges Member States
to exercise extra vigilance with respect to IRISL’s role
in violations of these resolutions.

The Committee further calls upon all Member States to
share – on a confidential basis, if necessary –
information regarding alleged violations of the measures
imposed in these resolutions. The Committee intends to
take seriously its mandate to examine and take appropriate
action on such information. The Committee remains
available to answer inquiries from Member States about the
obligations imposed by these resolutions.

5. (SBU) Proposed text of Iran Sanctions Committee letter
to Cyprus:

Excellency (CYPRUS),

On behalf of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006), I am writing you regarding your
letters to the Committee of February 3, February 12, and
March 26 regarding Security Council resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008).

The Committee would again like to express its appreciation
for the information the Republic of Cyprus provided
documenting the transfer of arms-related materiel from
Iran to Syria aboard the Cypriot-flagged vessel M/V
Monchegorsk. This information was useful to the Committee
in carrying out its mandate to examine and take
appropriate action regarding alleged violations of the
measures contained in these Security Council resolutions.
The Committee would also like to thank your government for
its responsible decision, in line with Cyprus’
international obligations, to retain the cargo.

After reviewing the information provided to the Committee
by the Republic of Cyprus, the Committee has confirmed
that this transfer was indeed in violation of paragraph
five of resolution 1747 (2007). As a violation of
resolution 1747, the cargo should not be transferred to
Syria nor returned to Iran. In line with its mandate to
examine and take appropriate action regarding alleged
violations of the measures imposed in the relevant
Security Council resolutions, the Committee provided the
parties involved an opportunity to provide additional
relevant information regarding this transaction. The
Committee is now in the process of notifying Member States
to be alert for possible future violations in similar
circumstances.

The Committee remains interested in receiving any
additional information you may have uncovered regarding
the cargo, such as further relevant details about the
ownership of the goods. The Committee has a particular
interest in knowing whether any of the cargo may be linked
to individuals or entities designated in the annexes of
Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and
1803 (2008).

The Committee encourages the Republic of Cyprus to
continue to detain the cargo pending further
investigation. Additionally, the Committee would also
appreciate any efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to
explore options for other Member States or relevant
regional organizations to assist in the storing,
safe-keeping, or disposing of the cargo.

6. (SBU) Proposed text of Iran Sanctions Committee letter
to Iran:

Excellency (IRAN),

On behalf of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006), I am writing you regarding the
measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008).

The Committee regrets that you did not reply to our
request for information regarding the transfer of
arms-related materiel from Iran aboard the M/V
Monchegorsk. As the Committee noted in its letter of
March 9, this transfer was in violation of paragraph five
of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007), which states:

“Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or
indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using
its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel,
and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the
territory of Iran.”

The Committee would like to recall that under Article 25
of the UN Charter, all Member States are obligated to
“accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council.” In light of this incident, the Committee
requests that Iran redouble its efforts to ensure full
compliance with the provisions of these resolutions.

The Committee would welcome at any time information from
Iran that may assist the Committee in carrying out its
mandate to examine and take appropriate action regarding
alleged violations of the measures imposed in relevant
Security Council resolutions.

7. (SBU) Proposed text of Iran Sanctions Committee letter
to Syria:

Excellency (SYRIA),

On behalf of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006), I am writing you regarding the
measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) relating to Iran.

On March 9, the Committee invited you to provide any
additional relevant information regarding the transfer of
arms-related materiel aboard the M/V Monchegorsk from Iran
to Syria. The Committee notes that in your response of
March 18 you neither denied that Syria was attempting to
procure arms-related materiel from Iran nor provided
additional relevant information regarding this particular
transaction.

As the Committee noted in its letter, this procurement of
arms-related materiel from Iran was in violation of
paragraph five of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007),
which states:

“Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or
indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using
its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel,
and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the
territory of Iran.”

The Committee would like to remind Syria that under
Article 25 of the UN Charter, all Member States are
obligated to “accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council.” In light of this incident, the
Committee requests that Syria redouble its efforts to
ensure full compliance with the provisions of these
resolutions.

The Committee would welcome at any time information from
Syria that may assist the Committee in carrying out its
mandate to examine and take appropriate action regarding
alleged violations of the measures imposed in relevant
Security Council resolutions.
CLINTON

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9798
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1432
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000272

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UNFICYP, CY, TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU’S APRIL 20
VISIT

REF: NICOSIA 266

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Your April 20 meeting with Republic of
Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou will demonstrate
continued high-level U.S. support for reunification
negotiations. You will want to note that the international
community has high expectations for these talks and that the
status quo on the island cannot continue. UN envoy Alexander
Downer recently argued “it is time to inject some uncertainty
in Greek Cypriots’ minds that this cannot go on forever.” We
ought to press Kyprianou on the RoC’s unhelpful foreign
policy turns; under President Demetris Christofias, Cyprus
has sought to warm relations with Havana, Caracas, Tehran,
Moscow, and Damascus. Last, you might want to raise our
continued interest in the cargo of the M/V Monchegorsk, a
Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged freighter carrying arms from
Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions. Cyprus
eventually ordered the ship to port and confiscated the
cargo, but has yet to answer the UN Sanctions Committee’s
request for details on cargo ownership. END SUMMARY.

——————————————— —
Tense Atmospherics in the Run-up to Your Meeting
——————————————— —

2. (C) You last saw Markos Kyprianou in Prague, on the
margins of the April 5 U.S.-EU summit. The Cypriot FM pushed
for increased pressure on Turkey to support the settlement
talks. A “new start in bilateral relations with the new U.S.
administration” was also on his mind, in the form of more
frequent political-level dialogue, greater U.S. support for
Christofias, more “gestures” toward the Greek Cypriot (G/C)
side, and a policy of “no surprises.” Kyprianou’s chief of
staff angrily cited that “no surprises” clause upon learning
you intended to receive Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat on April 15. The Ambassador sought to re-engage
Kyprianou regarding his visit before the FM’s departure for
Washington, but before a meeting could be arranged, the
Minister traveled to New York for meetings with Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon and other UN officials.

3. (C) A degree of “visit neuralgia” now grips the Greek
Cypriot community, spurring fears in this zero-sum region
that U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with Ankara somehow
downgraded our dealings with Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus. It reached fever pitch during the President’s
two-day visit to Turkey, but actually began with your own
March 7 joint statement with Turkish FM Ali Babacan. Your
pull-aside with Kyprianou in Prague lowered temperatures
temporarily, but they have jumped again. You can expect
Kyprianou to voice his displeasure over the April 15 Talat
visit, perhaps even complaining about having learned about it
from the media (the truth is that the T/C leader immediately
contacted President Christofias with the news, before anyone
released it publicly.)

——————————————— ————-
Relations with Cyprus: “The Problem,” and a Whole Lot More
——————————————— ————-

4. (C) During his 30-minute call on you April 20, Kyprianou
will want to focus on efforts to resolve the Cyprus question.
We are supporting the talks from the sidelines, urging
flexibility from the parties plus Turkey and Greece,
coordinating messages with our P-5 partners both locally and
in New York, discreetly funding substantive experts advising
the UN team, and promoting enactment of confidence-building
measures to improve the negotiating climate.

5. (C) President Christofias is invested heavily in getting
a deal — some say he has staked his legacy on it. History
shows, however, that G/C leaders lose little electorally by
taking hard lines in the talks. Christofias will not walk
away from the table; the risk is that the talks could die
slowly, with G/Cs citing Turkish and T/C “intransigence” as
the cause. To counter this, UN envoy Downer has adopted an
“inject some uncertainty” stance, publicly underlining the
negative outcomes for both sides if pro-solution leaders
Christofias and Talat do not reach agreement. Such
consequences could include changes to the UN Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) mandate or force level. We should support Downer
in this campaign by underscoring to Kyprianou and other G/C
leaders that now is the time to do a deal. Hard compromises
will be required from both sides, and the leaders have a
special responsibility to educate and lobby their respective
rank-and-file to support the process and an eventual deal.

NICOSIA 00000272 002 OF 003

6. (C) A caveat is in order. Negotiations to resolve the
Cyprus Problem take place in a community-to-community
framework, with the Republic of Cyprus president representing
Greek Cypriots and, since the 1983 declaration of the
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” the “TRNC president”
representing Turkish Cypriots. As such, the RoC FM does not
take active part in the bi-communal discussions. Even so,
Kyprianou has influence, and he attempts to shape debate in
meetings of the Council of Ministers, formally the RoC
executive branch’s highest deliberative body. In Brussels
and with fellow EU foreign ministers, he constantly lobbies
for tougher European positions vis-a-vis Ankara. In Cypriot
eyes — and amongst many Europeans hostile to Ankara joining
the Union — Turkish EU accession is dependent on moves to
normalize Turkey-Cyprus relations. Here Kyprianou has taken
a strong stance against the opening of further Acquis
negotiating chapters until Turkey extends its Customs Union
agreement to Nicosia, opens its ports and airports to Cypriot
craft, and drops its opposition to Cypriot membership in
international organizations of which Ankara is already a
member.

—————————————–
A Ledger That’s Unfortunately Tilting Red
—————————————–

7. (C) In regional and multilateral fora, there are
positives to report. Just three days ago, President
Christofias personally approved our request for landing
privileges for the aircraft carrying the lone surviving
Somali gunman from the Maersk Alabama hijacking. He voiced a
commitment to work with the U.S. and others to fight seaborne
piracy. The government in March ordered the deportation to
Greece of a terrorist wanted by Turkey, fully aware that
Ankara would seek extradition from Athens. Both are worthy
of your mention to Kyprianou.

8. (C) Our desire for a better relationship with Cyprus is
firm. Since Christofias’s election in February 2008,
however, we have witnessed an ideologically-motivated attempt
to turn back the clock to the heydays of the Non-Aligned
Movement. He has publicly praised Fidel Castro, welcomed a
new Venezuelan Embassy in Nicosia, lauded Iran, and vilified
NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Christofias’s
commitment to Russian President Dimitri Medvedev to promote
the latter’s European security proposal within the EU seems
gratuitous, and his outreach to Hugo Chavez and Venezuela
strikes us as an intentional move to distance his government
from the United States. While the questionable policy shift
is the president’s making, you should call Kyprianou on it,
urging him to use the new and/or upgraded relations with
rogue states to demand better behavior and improvements in
their abysmal human rights records.

9. (C) Cyprus’s new direction under Christofias has made
final resolution of the M/V Monchegorsk incident problematic.
Acting on reliable information, U.S. naval forces in January
boarded the Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged Monchegorsk,
finding cargo and documents indicating it was carrying arms
from Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions. Only
a full-court international press from the UN Security Council
and EU convinced Cyprus to summon the vessel to port for a
more-thorough inspection and eventual seizure of the cargo.
Subsequent RoC cooperation with the UN’s Iran Sanctions
Committee (ISC) has been half-hearted; we therefore recommend
that you question Kyprianou regarding the UN request for
Cyprus to share information on cargo ownership.

——————————
What’s Topping His To-Do List?
——————————

10. (C) Upon departing for the United States on April 15,
the Cypriot Foreign Minister repeated his mantra that the
U.S. Government should pressure Turkey regarding a Cyprus
settlement. Kyprianou has not specified what he would have
us press Ankara to do, however. Our view, shared by the UN’s
Downer, is that Turkey mainly is observing the talks at this
point, not directing them. You might push Kyprianou for
concrete actions the international community might take with
Ankara to spur greater Cyprus Problem movement.

11. (C) He will get specific on two closely-related matters,
however. Part and parcel of its non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus, Ankara regularly opposes Cypriot
membership in international bodies in which the GoT already
sits, from the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology

NICOSIA 00000272 003 OF 003

Control Regime (MTCR) to the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Of greatest recent interest to
Nicosia has been a spot in the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), since Cyprus maintains the
world’s eleventh-largest merchant fleet. Both in Washington
and on the island, Cyprus has sought our support in its bid
to join, and Kyprianou may push as well; our general policy
is to support Cypriot membership in entities that are global
and inclusive in nature. Turkey, which has contributed a
ship and helicopter, opposes Cypriot participation in the
CGPCS unless all UN states are admitted. The FM may also
raise Turkish naval vessels’ recent harassment of
Cypriot-contracted research vessels conducting natural gas
and petroleum exploration off the island’s southern coast.
The RoC has responded by blocking the opening of the EU
Acquis energy chapter in Brussels. We have been urging
moderation and restraint on both sides.

———
Who He Is
———

12. (C) Son of former Republic of Cyprus President Spyros
Kyprianou, the Cypriot FM was educated at all the right
schools, including Cambridge and Harvard, and was groomed
from an early age for politics. His name recognition here is
such that pundits refer to him only as “Markos,” a la Elvis
or Madonna. Most Cypriots believe he will eventually become
president, and both AKEL (far left) and DISY (right-center)
approached him in 2007 to be a joint (but formally
non-aligned) candidate to challenge then-President Tassos
Papadopoulos. Kyprianou demurred, mainly because
Papadopoulos and he belong to the same DIKO party, albeit
from different factions. Once Papadopoulos failed to advance
to the second round of elections in February 2008, AKEL’s
Christofias sought and obtained DIKO’s support, acceding to
the latter party’s demand to name Kyprianou foreign minister
if he emerged victorious. Christofias won the race and
brought the DIKO man into his cabinet.

13. (C) The relationship between the Cypriot president and
his FM is icy by all accounts. Their Cyprus Problem
philosophies are miles apart, for example, with Kyprianou
much more the hard-liner. Personally, the small-townish,
USSR-educated, and far-from-eloquent Christofias feels a bit
diminutive next to his aristocratic minister. The president
has responded by isolating Kyprianou from the talks and
minimizing his influence by seeking greater powers for the
Presidential Diplomatic Office, staffed by more trusted
confidants. On the Monchegorsk incident and dealings with
Syria, as well as on relations with Havana and Caracas, it is
clear that the Christofias Palace, not the Kyprianou MFA, is
clearly at the helm.
Urbancic

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